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To be Burmese is Not (Only) 
Being Buddhist
François Robinne
Culpability of the Kala
“Being Burmese is Being Buddhist”, declares the title of the opening 
article by Guillaume Rozenberg, published in the first volume of 
Contemporary Burma (2008). This paradigm is widely shared among 
Burmese Buddhists but is refuted by non-Buddhists. When asked about 
their nationality, Muslims describe Buddhists as “Bama” (Burmese) 
and themselves as “Muslim”. This process, in turn, bases the identity 
after ethnic ties (taing-yin-tha)1 for the former (Bama) instead of on 
customary ways of living and religious affiliation (badhaye) for the 
latter (Muslim).2 In Christian communities, Protestants use a similar 
kind of approximation by combining the ethnic and the confessional, 
which does not substitute nationality for the religious denomination 
but instead links ethnic identifiers with religious ones (as seen in the 
case of the Zomi Baptist Convention, Kachin Baptist Convention, Lisu 
Baptist Convention and so on).
1 See Judson 1966 [1853]: 723 who defines badhaye as “language; mode of practice, 
customary way; a particular system of faith and worship”, therefore conflating the 
religious and the cultural, as the Muslims of Burma nowadays do.
2 The literal meaning of taing-yin-tha is “son close to the territory”, a term that 
designates the population of the highlands as peripheral to the central plain of the 
Irrawaddy.
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In the same article, Rozenberg incorporates the idea that a racial 
identifier matters in the country, and distinguishes it from ethnic groups 
by explaining how the former has a tendency to “classify, hierarchize, 
and explain” (2008: 30). Moreover, he argues “that the notion of race 
differentiates itself from the idea of an ethnic group, insofar as that 
while both include a biological component, the latter also involves a 
cultural element that [...] does not lead to hierarchy of groups” (2008: 
35). Yet through this distinction, ethnicity is once again reduced 
to a biological and cultural dimension that, it was hoped, had long 
disappeared from the anthropological debate. Carried away with his 
controversial “argument”, Rozenberg does not correlate, at any time, 
the concepts of “race” and ethnicity with the two decades of civil war 
that followed independence, or the similar recent violence between 
Buddhists and Muslims.
But even though this form of racial reasoning has reinforced 
itself in recent times, it is far from new. The vernacular terms lu-myo 
(“type of people”) and taing-yin-tha (“sons close to the territory”) 
are translated to English in a variety of ways including “nations” 
or “inhabitants” (Sangermano 1966 [1833]: 42), “races” (Enriquez 
1933 [1923]) or even as “hill tribes”. More recent literature describes 
these terms as referring to “ethnic groups” or “indigenous people”. 
In particular, the expression taing-yin-tha stands in opposition to the 
phrases Yangon-tha or Mandalay-tha, which signify “sons of Yangon/
Mandalay” and refer to the people of central Burma, who are mostly 
Burmese and Buddhist. Significantly, the Burmese term taing-yin-tha, 
mentioned in constitutional texts, is translated to English as “races”. 
Moreover, the utilization of the word “races” amongst English-speaking 
Burmese is so common that, despite the fact Burma is a country in 
transition, it has at no time been challenged.
All through the successive Government of Burma Acts passed by 
the colonial administration (The 1947 Constitution and the Nationalities 
1999: 19, 29), the country was divided on an ethnic-racial basis.3 This 
3 The Burmese version of the first constitutional text of 1947 contains the term 
tain-yin-tha (son close to the territory) alongside naingnan tha (son of the nation) 
and naingnan physical mhu (citizenship) (The Constitution of the Union of Burma 
1947 [1958]: 2).
13 Metamorphosis ch13IT-2P.indd   347 21/8/15   5:39 pm
348 François Robinne
started with the first Constitution of 1947, was strengthened by the 
second Constitution of 1974 and was ratified by the controversial 
National Convention text of 2008, which now serves as the de facto 
Constitution. The 2008 text, in addition to confirming the seven 
Burmese-dominated existing administrative divisions (taing-detha-kyī) 
and the seven peripheral states (pyi-nay) that already had an attached 
ethnic dimension, legalizes the existence of six new ethnic groups and 
assigns each a self-administered zone (Ko Paing Oak Kyup Khwin Phyu 
Daytha). The Naga, Danu, Pao, Palaung, Wa and Kokang are now 
counted as ethnic groups to the same degree as have so far been the 
Kachin, Kayah, Karen (Kayin), Chin, Môn, Arakanese (Rakhaing) and 
Shan (Constitution of the Union of Myanmar 2008: 17–8). By making 
those differentiations between groups perennial, the ethnic divide of 
the country becomes significantly reinforced, with the modus operandi 
of communal nation building remaining a potentially explosive issue. 
Burma is burying itself in a fight that belongs to another era—as seen 
through the resumption of violence between the Burmese army and 
the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), which was supposed to have 
become a border patrol—and setting the country back decades. Under 
the guise of building a nation-state, Burma is retreating once again 
into the contradictions of an “ethnic-groups nation”, strengthening the 
development of an ethnic state rather than contributing to the emergency 
of a nation-state. Through its ability to tap into a stock that it feeds 
on, renews or reactivates depending on the circumstances, the junta 
has mastered the art of generating its own enemies (Callahan 2003). 
The question, therefore, is to what extent ethnic and religious elites are 
ready to break this conflicting communitarian dynamic.
Ethnic groups are generally referred as taing-yin-tha, an allusion 
to the peripheral regions they dominate. They are neither true nationals 
nor strangers, but rather a kind of alter ego watched over by the armed 
branch of the nation. To designate this more distant other, Buddhist 
Burmese usually invoke the concept of the “stranger”. The most common 
Burmese expression for stranger, relatively neutral in connotation, 
is naingnan khya, which literally means “of [another] country” but 
which does not apply to all foreigners. In fact, it is typically used to 
designate Muslims of Indian origin, who are, in the same way, called 
“Kala”.
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The broad and evolving semantic field of this word is indicative of 
a rampant xenophobia that consists of stigmatizing the other—whether 
black, Indian or Muslim—through exclusive terms, as seen by the very 
negative connotation of Kala, rather than through inclusive, or even 
at least neutral, terms. Found commonly throughout Southeast Asia, 
“Kala” is a term of Sanskrit origin that could refer to Pataikkhaya: a 
place located in the Indian district of Tippera, northeast of Chittagong 
(Than Tun 1978: 12; Pe Maung Tin and Luce 1960 [1923]: 98).4
The expression refers metaphorically and pejoratively to a general 
“abroad”. The Burmese linked the term, probably during the 19th 
century in the wake of the British colonization of the country, to the 
adjective “white”, Kala phyu,5 which is a de facto counterpart to the 
association between Kala and blackness. The Burmese also use the 
expression “negroe” to describe any dark-skinned person. People of 
Indian origin, without prejudice to their religious affiliation, have 
always been seen as the ultimate Kala. In 1978, Ne Win succeeded in 
imposing, without a coup, the nationalization of private property and 
wealth, causing a mass exodus of the Chinese population as well as 
of all the other communities that would have been described as Kala, 
including Sikh, Hindu, Christian and Muslim communities. It was only 
recently, under the leadership of the nationalist monk Wirathu, that the 
term became explicitly equated with “Muslim”. This kind of discourse 
and stigmatization comes in the wake of the administrative discrimination 
Muslims now face, whether when trying to enrol in universities or even, 
as 2012–3 showed, when attempting to obtain an identity card.
Nationality, officially recognized through an identity card, is 
a useful indicator in understanding how Burma’s policy towards 
minorities, especially non-Buddhist minorities (such as Christians and 
4 Pe Maung Tin and Luce (1960 [1923]: 98) mention that “Anarathaminsaw was a 
king full of glory, might of arm, and dominion, and these were the boundaries of his 
kingdom: westward, the Kala country of Pateikkara …”
5 Yule and Burnell (1989 [1886]: 495) define Kula, Kla as follows: “Burmese name 
for a native of Continental India; and hence misapplied also to the English and 
other Westerners who have come from India to Burma; in fact used generally for 
a Western foreigner.” Judson (1966 [1852]: 194) gives a similar definition: “One 
whose race is distinctly marked, a caste person; a native of any country west of 
Burma; a foreigner.” The term amyo descends from the word lu myo (type of people). 
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Muslims), has evolved. By examining expired identity cards, I have 
been able to establish three distinctive post-independence periods. The 
dates below should be understood as being approximated for successive 
periods corresponding to different criteria for Burmese citizenship.
From 1948–56, non-Burmese would receive a certificate of 
citizenship called pyi ton su Myanma naingan daw, naingnan tha 
pyumhu laykmhat, whose literal translation is “to make (pyu) son (tha) 
of the country (naingnan)”. I was able to examine two rare copies of 
these. The certificates had been made for Haji U.P., a descendant of 
one of the first Panthay families to settle in Mandalay, and Haji U.K.,6 
who had been born in Kengtung in Shan state. The latter certificate 
stated “Chinese” (tayut) for nationality (lumyo), with “Muslim” in 
parentheses. Both specified whether the men spoke the Burmese 
language or not. Moreover, the fact that the origin of both subjects 
was specified should be seen as linked to the creation of the country’s 
first post-independence state constitution, which distinguished three 
ethnic states—Kachin, Karen and Chin Special Division—within 
Burma.
From the late 1950s up until 1990, a thethaykan identity card 
(meaning “life death”) was attributed in the name of the Union of 
Myanmar (the full name being pyi tonsu Myanma naingnandaw thayk 
the kapya). Besides the bearer’s name and the name of his or her 
father, the card specified the bearer’s gender, height, specific physical 
attributes, blood type, occupation and marital status. No mention was 
made of either the bearer’s origin or religion. That period encompassed 
an economic struggle against entrepreneurs, who were for the most 
part Indian and Chinese, as well as a religious struggle opposing 
Christians and Muslims to Buddhists. It was in this context of 
exacerbated political instability, by then extending all over of Burma, 
that the citizenship law was amended in 1982. Even today, the fact 
that this amendment was made without being approved by parliament 
remains extremely controversial.
6 Given the continued violence and climate of fear in the country, I have chosen, for the 
first time in my career, to preserve the anonymity of my sources. They will recognize 
themselves and I thank them for their trust.
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Between 1990 and 2003, a “National Certificate Register”, called 
naingnan tha sisikye katpya, was created, with holders now needing 
to specify their nationality and religion. For the sake of succinctness, 
I will illustrate the consequences of this in the context of the Panthay 
community. Basically, it signified that if you declared yourself to be 
Muslim, you could not be considered Burman. It meant that if you 
were Burman, you were necessarily a Buddhist. In other words, if 
you considered yourself Muslim, then you became de facto Burmese 
plus Indian, or Burmese plus Chinese, or Burmese plus Shan Chinese. 
Officially, Burmese and Muslim could not coexist as one identity. How 
the decision to include Chinese or Indian on the identity card was 
made remains mysterious, since the nationality of both parents would 
not have been mentioned in the identity records of previous eras. If no 
document specified that you were “Chinese”, you then automatically 
would be considered “Indian”, and did not belong to one of the other 
minorities. On some occasions, “India” is even inscribed twice before 
“Burma” as place of origin, so as to leave no room for doubt for the 
Burmese authorities.
The consequences of the citizenship law amendment of 1982 are 
felt even today. In particular, Article 4 of the amendment empowers 
the State Council to decide people of which ethnic group will be 
considered citizens of the state, or nationals. Besides the Rohingya 
community, citizens of Indian and Muslim identity also fear the 
upcoming national census realized in 2014. This new census serves as 
the basis on which access to citizenship is defined in anticipation of the 
2015 presidential elections. Since the 1982 amendment was not made 
through parliamentary means it is increasingly judged unconstitutional, 
and voices from various spheres of civil society are demanding a return 
to the citizenship law of 1948 as the sole source of constitutional 
legitimacy.
Tensions are therefore high amongst target communities trying to 
obtain an identity card; applicants compare the process to an endurance 
test. Two different identity cards are currently issued: one is valid 
up to the age of 18, while the other is valid for life. Members of 
ethnic and religious minorities face extreme difficulties in obtaining 
correct identification. Many of them actually write their religion as 
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“Buddhist” so as to avoid administrative peril. Thus they are forced 
to lie about or renounce (at least outwardly) their actual faith, even to 
their relatives, which is a painful process. The Chinese origin of the 
Panthay Muslims can therefore be denied by the mere fact that, for 
the Burmese government, being Muslim is tantamount to being Indian, 
that is to say, being Kala.
The increasingly complex issuance of identity cards is in itself 
indicative of a state of mind where the stigma surrounding the 
religious tends to overshadow ethnic antagonism, except when the 
two are combined. In this delicate period of political transition, the 
focus should not be so much on how to decipher and identify evidence 
of the reasons for inter-communal tension. After all, the tendency to 
exacerbate identity, stigmatization of the other in the multi-ethnic and 
multi-confessional, rise of nationalism and appropriation of wealth in 
the context of globalization are nothing new. None of this is sufficient 
to explain the resurgence of sectarian violence—ethnic in the past 
and religious today—which has been plaguing the country since 
independence. The recent violence against Muslims is just one more 
incarnation of these conflicts. To understand and be able to abandon 
the dualism of Burmese or non-Burmese, Buddhist or non-Buddhist is 
therefore important in comprehending why the enunciation of the ethnic 
and the religious is applied differently within Christian and Muslim 
denominations.
Christianizing Local Cultures
Ethnic minorities are estimated to constitute about 30 per cent of the 
total population, and about 15 per cent of the total population is non-
Buddhist, including: ± 5 per cent Christian, ± 4 per cent Muslim, ± 
0.5 per cent Hindu (Sunquist 2001: 574). Outside of the fact that these 
percentages clearly need to be updated, they are reductive in many 
ways. Burma’s linguistic, social and religious diversity is far more 
complex than mere numbers can show.
The hold of Christianity is stronger on moving deeper into Chin 
state. The road leading to Hakha is lined with headstones topped with 
crosses, there are churches with bell towers in most villages, and 
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house doors and walls are covered in white chalk graffiti praising 
Christ. Even shop signs often showcase the owner’s faith. In Tedim, for 
example, there are two grocery and hardware stores called, respectively, 
the Adventist Store and Mother Theresa Boarder, snack bars called 
Amen Coffee Shop and Alleluhia Tea Shop, and the hut of a betel seller 
bears a sign stating “Bethel Assembly of God”. Baptist Presbyterian, 
Pentecostal and Catholic churches litter the area, frequently displaying 
a surprisingly wide range of denominations. Some churches also 
regularly have tiny local branches in the area with names like The 
Church, The Church on the Rock, Yahwa of God or Theocratic Christ 
Baptist Church. While such local churches were created by small 
groups of families whose influence generally does not extend beyond 
the village limits, they are nonetheless supported covertly by much 
larger mother churches, usually in the USA or elsewhere in the West. 
Even the churches that have seceded from larger movements face, 
within their ranks, other smaller secessionist enterprises or the establish-
ment of independent churches. A notable example is the Pentecostal 
Movement which separated from the Gospel Movement (itself the result 
of a schism from the Full Gospel Church) that had seceded much earlier 
from the Baptist mother church. The region is thus, unsurprisingly, 
seeing an active wave of proselytism, with recently introduced churches 
booming and expanding, such as the Seventh-day Adventists, Jehovah’s 
Witnesses and the Believers Church of Jesus Christ.
However, while Christian proselytizing is still very dynamic, 
nowadays the conversions do not really go much beyond the already 
converted Christians. Competition is actually very tough amongst 
denominations. Based on a July 2005 trip to six villages in the region 
of Hakha, a place of worship served, on average, 30 houses, though 
sometimes the number was as low as 10. More significantly, the 
six villages included 22 different denominations, or 24 if we count 
Hindu and Buddhist temples. Surveys conducted in November of the 
same year in other villages confirmed the wide diversity of existing 
Christian denominations in one place, with similar findings being made 
in the regions of Falam and Tedim. The general trend is, therefore, 
towards the development and concomitant fragmentation of religious 
congregations.
13 Metamorphosis ch13IT-2P.indd   353 21/8/15   5:39 pm
Vi
lla
ge
s
Zo
rk
hu
a
(H
ak
ha
)
C
hu
nc
un
g
(H
ak
ha
)
N
ab
ua
l
(H
ak
ha
)
H
ni
ar
la
w
n
(H
ak
ha
)
N
ew
 S
ak
ta
(H
ak
ha
)
O
ld
 S
ak
ta
(H
ak
ha
)
Su
rk
hu
a
(H
ak
ha
)
C
on
gr
eg
at
io
n
As
se
m
bl
y 
of
 G
od
Ba
pt
is
t
C
at
ho
lic
 (R
C
)
C
hu
rc
h 
of
 
Je
su
s 
C
hr
is
t
G
os
pe
l
R
ev
iv
al
 (R
V)
U
ni
te
d 
Pe
nt
ec
os
ta
l
C
hu
rc
h
Se
ve
nt
h-
da
y
Ad
ve
nt
is
t C
hu
rc
h
Th
e 
C
hu
rc
h
Je
ho
va
h'
s 
W
itn
es
s
Bu
dd
hi
st
 T
em
pl
e
TO
TA
L  
(P
la
ce
s 
of
 w
or
-
sh
ip
/h
ou
se
ho
ld
s 
ra
tio
)
1 2 - 1 - - - - - - -
4 
ch
ur
ch
es
18
0 
ho
us
eh
ol
ds
(1
/4
5)
1 1 1 - 1 - - 1 1 - 1
7 c
hu
rch
es
 &
 te
mp
le
36
0 
ho
us
eh
ol
ds
(1
/5
1)
1 1 - - - 1 - - - - -
3 
ch
ur
ch
es
53
 h
ou
se
ho
ld
s
(1
/1
7)
- 1 - - 1 - 1 1 - - -
4 
ch
ur
ch
es
19
0 
ho
us
eh
ol
ds
(1
/4
7)
1 1 1 - - - - - - - -
3 
ch
ur
ch
es
10
0 
ho
us
eh
ol
ds
(1
/3
3)
1 1 - - - - - - - - -
2 
ch
ur
ch
es
68
 h
ou
se
ho
ld
s
(1
/3
4)
1 1 - 1 - - - - - 1 -
4 
ch
ur
ch
es
25
3 
ho
us
eh
ol
ds
(1
/6
3)
(S
pl
it 
fro
m
 B
ap
tis
t i
n 
20
03
)
(S
pl
it 
fro
m
 B
ap
tis
t i
n 
19
95
)
(J
ub
ile
e 
in
 1
99
9)
(E
st
ab
lis
he
d 
in
 1
99
8)
(1
8 
ho
us
eh
ol
ds
)
(5
0 
ho
us
eh
ol
ds
)
(3
 h
ou
se
ho
ld
s)
T
ab
le
 1
. C
h
ri
st
ia
n
 P
lu
ra
li
sm
 in
 th
e 
H
ak
h
a 
R
eg
io
n
So
ur
ce
: F
. R
ob
in
ne
, f
ie
ld
 w
or
k,
 2
00
5.
13 Metamorphosis ch13IT-2P.indd   354 21/8/15   5:39 pm
Vi
lla
ge
s
Lu
ng
pi
(F
al
am
)
Su
nt
hl
a
(F
al
am
)
M
an
gk
he
ng
(F
al
am
)
Ta
is
ho
n
(F
al
am
)
N
ot
es
Co
ng
re
ga
tio
n
As
se
m
bl
y 
of
 G
od
Ba
pt
is
t
Be
lie
ve
rs
 C
hu
rc
h 
of
 J
es
us
 C
hr
is
t
C
at
ho
lic
 (R
C
)
C
hu
rc
h 
of
 J
es
us
 C
hr
is
t
Ev
an
ge
lis
t B
ap
tis
t C
hu
rc
h
G
os
pe
l
Pr
es
by
te
ria
n 
C
hu
rc
h
R
ev
iv
al
 C
hu
rc
h
R
ef
or
m
 C
hu
rc
h
H
in
du
 T
em
pl
e
Bu
dd
hi
st
 T
em
pl
e
TO
TA
L 
(P
la
ce
s 
of
 w
or
sh
ip
/
ho
us
eh
ol
ds
 ra
tio
)
1 2 1 - - 1 - 1 - - 1 1
8 
ch
ur
ch
es
 &
 te
m
pl
es
10
0 
ho
us
eh
ol
ds
(1
/1
2)
- 1 - - - - 1 - 1 1 - -
4 
ch
ur
ch
es
10
1 
ho
us
eh
ol
ds
(1
/2
5)
- 1 1 1 1 - - - - 1 - -
5 
ch
ur
ch
es
12
0 
ho
us
eh
ol
ds
(1
/2
4)
- 1 - - - - - - - - - 1
2 
ch
ur
ch
es
 &
 te
m
pl
es
11
8 
ho
us
eh
ol
ds
(1
/5
9)
Sp
lit
 fr
om
 B
ap
tis
t i
n 
19
87
O
rig
in
at
ed
 fr
om
 In
di
a
Sp
lit
 fr
om
 B
ap
tis
t i
n 
20
03
/2
00
4
G
ur
kh
a 
co
m
m
un
ity
So
ur
ce
: F
. R
ob
in
ne
, f
ie
ld
 w
or
k,
 2
00
5.
(5
5 
ho
us
eh
ol
ds
)
(5
7 
ho
us
eh
ol
ds
)
(7
0 
ho
us
eh
ol
ds
)
(A
pp
ro
x.
 7
 h
ou
se
ho
ld
s)
(1
2 
ho
us
eh
ol
ds
)
(A
pp
ro
x.
 5
 h
ou
se
ho
ld
s)
(A
pp
ro
x.
 2
0 
ho
us
eh
ol
ds
)
(1
6 
ho
us
eh
ol
ds
)
(1
5 
ho
us
eh
ol
ds
)
(1
3 
ho
us
eh
ol
ds
)
(9
 h
ou
se
ho
ld
s 
in
 2
00
1,
 2
0 
in
 2
00
5)
T
ab
le
 2
. C
h
ri
st
ia
n
 P
lu
ra
li
sm
 in
 th
e 
Fa
la
m
 R
eg
io
n
13 Metamorphosis ch13IT-2P.indd   355 21/8/15   5:39 pm
V
ill
a
g
e
s
G
a
w
n
m
u
a
l
(T
e
d
im
)
T
u
a
lz
a
n
g
(T
e
d
im
)
S
a
iz
a
n
g
(T
e
d
im
)
M
u
a
lb
e
m
(T
e
d
im
)
N
o
te
s
C
o
n
g
re
g
a
tio
n
A
ss
e
m
b
ly
 o
f 
G
o
d
B
a
p
tis
t
C
a
th
o
lic
 (
R
C
)
C
h
ri
st
ia
n
 B
a
p
tis
t 
C
h
u
rc
h
o
f 
M
ya
n
m
a
r
E
va
n
g
e
lis
t 
B
a
p
tis
t 
C
h
u
rc
h
E
va
n
g
e
lis
t 
C
h
u
rc
h
 o
f 
C
h
ri
st
F
u
ll 
G
o
sp
e
l B
a
p
tis
t 
C
h
u
rc
h
P
re
sb
yt
e
ri
a
n
 C
h
u
rc
h
U
n
ite
d
 P
e
n
te
co
st
a
l C
h
u
rc
h
7
th
 D
a
y 
A
d
ve
n
tis
t 
C
h
u
rc
h
T
h
e
o
cr
a
tic
 C
h
ri
st
 B
a
p
tis
t
C
h
u
rc
h
Y
a
h
w
a
 o
f 
G
o
d
Y
a
h
w
e
h
 C
h
u
rc
h
Z
o
m
i B
a
p
tis
t 
C
o
n
ve
n
tio
n
o
f 
M
ya
n
m
a
r
L
a
i P
ia
n
S
ia
n
g
 S
a
w
n
P
a
u
 C
in
 H
a
u
 J
e
su
s 
P
a
w
lp
i
B
u
d
d
h
is
t T
e
m
p
le
T
O
TA
L 
(P
la
ce
s 
o
f 
w
o
rs
h
ip
/
h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
s 
ra
tio
)
1 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 1 - 1 1 - - 1 - - -
9 
ch
ur
ch
es
86
 h
ou
se
ho
ld
s 
(1
/9
)
- 1 1 - - - - - - 1 - - - 2 1 1 - 1
8 
ch
ur
ch
es
 &
 te
m
pl
e
93
 h
ou
se
ho
ld
s 
(1
/1
1)
1 1 1 - 1 - 1 - - - - - - - - 1 - -
6 
ch
ur
ch
es
37
0 
ho
us
eh
ol
ds
 (1
/6
1)
1 1 1 - - - - - - 1 - - 1 - 1 1 1 -
8 
ch
ur
ch
es
25
0 
ho
us
eh
ol
ds
 (1
/3
1)
- 1 1 - - - - - - - - - - 1 1 - -
4 
ch
ur
ch
es
13
0 
ho
us
eh
ol
ds
 (1
/3
2)
T
e
k
 L
u
i
(T
e
d
im
)
M
ua
lb
em
: 3
 m
em
be
rs
 a
nd
 
2 
ho
us
eh
ol
ds
 in
 1
98
1
C
re
at
ed
 c
irc
a 
19
35
Sp
lit
 fr
om
 B
ap
tis
t i
n 
19
87
O
rig
in
at
ed
 fr
om
 In
di
a
Sp
lit
 fr
om
 B
ap
tis
t i
n 
20
03
Sp
lit
 fr
om
 L
ai
 P
ia
n 
in
 2
00
5
So
ur
ce
: F
. R
ob
in
ne
, f
ie
ld
 w
or
k,
 2
00
5.
(B
ui
lt 
in
 th
e 
19
80
')
(B
ui
lt 
in
 th
e 
19
80
')
(B
ui
lt 
in
 th
e 
19
80
')
(B
ui
lt 
in
 th
e 
19
80
')
(B
ui
lt 
in
 th
e 
19
80
')
T
ab
le
 3
. C
h
ri
st
ia
n
 P
lu
ra
li
sm
 in
 th
e 
T
ed
im
 R
eg
io
n
13 Metamorphosis ch13IT-2P.indd   356 21/8/15   5:39 pm
357To be Burmese is Not (Only) being Buddhist
Kachin state shares with Chin state a strong Christian pluralism: 
the city of Myitkyina has a total of 33 churches within its limits (and 
had 157 churches in 1982). It is unlikely that the number has increased 
significantly since ceasefire was signed, in the mid-1990s between 
ethnic armed groups and the Burmese junta, because the agreement 
forbids the construction of any non-Buddhist places of worship.
The Kachin Baptist Convention is arguably the most influential 
church, not only among the Jinghpaw, the main Kachin subgroup, 
but in the whole state. Beyond its evangelizing function, it views 
itself as having a unifying mission, and spearheads the pan-Kachin 
movement. Significantly, the church has actually been developing 
outside of Kachin state: in Mandalay, where youth of all minorities 
converge, as well as in Kokang, at the northeastern edge of Shan 
state and near the Chinese border, where an evangelical college was 
created. While it is the premier Christian institution in Kachin state, 
it must now deal with Protestant movements that wish to emancipate 
themselves from its influence and consider the Kachin Baptist 
Convention as unacceptable for the multi-ethnic and multi-religious 
Kachin subgroups.
On the one hand are those who joined the Myanmar Council of 
Churches (MCC) and thereby participate in ecumenical meetings held 
once a year. This is particularly true of the Kachin Baptist Convention, 
Kachin Baptist Church Jinghpaw majority of the Karen Baptist 
Church, Lisu Baptist Church and Independent Christian Mission, 
among which the unity has proven difficult to maintain. On the other 
hand, there are the many groups that have broken off all contact with 
the other Christian congregations. Among these is the Mawyin Baptist 
Church, which was the first to leave the ranks of the Kachin Baptist 
Convention after objecting to the presence of Western missionaries 
in the 1960s, followed by the fundamentalists who seceded in two 
stages: first in the early 1970s from Bhamo, and then in the 1980s 
from Myitkyina.
The tenuous link between ethnic category and religious category 
is not new (Roy 2008). In 1859, the Baptist Missionary Union, 
headquartered in the USA, decided to restructure the Burma Baptist 
Convention in order to centralize it (Maung Shwe Wa 1963: 253). 
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Around local places of worship—which had been at first, during 
the first wave of the Christians missions in the first half of the 19th 
century, quasi-autonomous due to being located in difficult-to-access 
mountainous areas—a larger grouping was made around bigger 
linguistic units headquartered in the lowlands. This led to the creation 
of Burmese, Karen and Shan places of worship.
This process of ethnic and religious bipolarization thereafter 
continued concurrently with the process of political centralization. 
Following the Burmese of 1962 and the removal of the Shan Sawbwa, 
the Kachin leaders decided to dissolve the fragmented chiefdoms in 
order to avoid a similar fate. The creation of the Kachin Independence 
Organization (KIO) and its armed branch, the KIA, ended the traditional 
political system as it had existed and created a centralized military 
command that opposed the Burmese junta.
The 50 years of civil war that came to an end in the mid-1990s, 
led to the need for ethnic minorities to find, during peacetime, the 
identity coherence that the war had artificially helped prevail in 
their communities. On one hand the civil war contributed to give 
consistency to a pan-Kachin movement transcending—within the 
limits of political divisions—clan and ethnic belonging; on the 
other hand, the idea of belonging to a common group of identity 
was considerably weakened after the ceasefires, everyone tending to 
assert their confessional, clan and nationalist prerogatives at different 
levels of scale. Where years of war appeared to impose a common 
ideal—with sometimes a return to shamanistic rituals through which 
soldiers of the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), mostly Christians, 
drew strength and courage—the years of peace have undermined the 
pan-Kachin ideology opposed to local interests. In the same way, the 
building of a nation-state is undermined by the limits of an ethnic 
state and its potential conflictual dynamics (Robinne 2007: 101). 
Moreover, it obliged the Burmese central power to sanction the 
establishment of a united and consensual constitution. It was in this 
context of general destabilization that the Baptist elites appropriated 
for themselves, in the 2000s, the concept of a “holistic mission”, 
the stakes of which would be just as nationalist, but which would 
combine in a new and unique way the “ethnic”, with a totalizing 
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approach to religion.7 This concept of a “holistic mission” was 
relatively new among evangelical Christians. It dates back, however, 
to the 1968 Uppsala Assembly of the World Council of Churches, 
while the semantic field of “Christian mission” was redefined at 
the 1974 Lausanne Congress on World Evangelization (Padilla 
2005). The original doctrinal orientation, which maintains that the 
being disappears behind total evangelical truth, was revised as regards 
the definition of the concept of “mission”, which added an internal 
proselytizing dimension, indicating that the holistic message will be 
preached to followers.
Overall, when interrogated, informants found the large 
semantic value of the “holistic mission” to be incomprehensible and 
immediately had strong reservations towards the totalitarian and 
racist risks associated with the excesses of the holistic message. 
“Purification” is, for instance, a term that comes up frequently, but it 
is often referred to without consideration of its racial and totalitarian 
connotations. However, others, whose demand for anonymity I will 
respect, believe that democracy will never allow the holistic mission 
to reach its ultimate goal, their discourse being the fruit of a 
conceptualized ideal pan-Kachin policy that aligns itself with Burmese-
Buddhist otherness.
A senior official of the Kachin Baptist Convention (KBC) defined 
for me, in 2006, a “holistic mission” as the convergence of body, 
mind and soul before adding: “This is why the KBC uses culture 
to worship God. The culture needs to be modified or adapted to the 
Bible.” The holistic mission, therefore, affirms itself as a prism that 
is designed to systematize into a whole politics, culture, education 
and religion, insofar that the religious is deemed to be a part of 
the whole and the whole at once. In the case of Kachin, it means 
that this evangelical message transcends everything (and is above 
everything) and that all that is related to religion is not solely the 
7 The Christian acceptance of the holistic concept that argues that the religious is at once 
in all things and above all things, needs to be distinguished from the anthropological 
approaches of holism that see the latter as being connected to a wider cultural and 
structural Whole, as well as to a broader social Whole that it exceeds (Otto and 
Bubandt 2010).
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domain of the Baptists. Although Baptist elites are the only ones—
to my knowledge—to commonly use the term “holistic mission”, 
the religious dimension is constitutive of more than just a social, 
political and cultural order: it is a directive that must be accepted by 
all Christians as simultaneously being above and encompassing all 
things.
If being Burmese is to be Buddhist, being Kachin or Chin or 
Karen is, for a large part of the population, synonymous with being 
Christian, regardless of the religious denomination. Attacking Christian 
interests in Kachin state means de facto taking the risk of alienating 
the civil (the KIO), religious (Kachin Theological College) and military 
factions (the KIA). After almost 50 years of civil war, the recent 
renewed conflict between the Burmese army and the KIA shows how 
ceasefire remains weak in this unstable period, but that Christian 
minorities are spared from Buddhist condemnation and popular outrage. 
This is not the case for Muslims, at whom is now targeted hatred for 
the other.
Islamizing the Muslims of Burma
If the number of churches is difficult to count due to the fragmentation 
of Christian denominations, the number of mosques is known: there are 
86 solely in the city of Mandalay. Similar to Christian denominations, 
Muslim movements and religious schools are remarkable for their 
propensity to multiply. Moreover, both Christian and Buddhist 
denominations are extremely dynamic when it comes to proselytizing 
and preaching, but mostly limit their activity to the wider community 
of believers. There can also be observed a similar tendency, though 
a few decades apart, towards uniformization as advocated by both 
Christian and Muslim elites. Notably, the holistic Christian discourse 
of purification—an acculturation or assimilation of local (and already 
Christianized) cultures—is comparable to the Islamization strategy 
of Burmese Muslims advocated in the mid-1970s by the Tabligh 
Association. The great migratory waves of the 19th century, which were 
undertaken by some groups in the wake of the colonial administration, 
and by others following the defeat of the Sultanate of Tali in Yunnan, 
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are now long past; the expansion of Islam in Burma has mostly been 
through demographic development and Islamic laws on marriage and 
filiation. Proselytizing is itself mostly limited to within the Muslim 
community and is the domain of the Preaching Association (called 
“tabligh” in Bengali).
Created in the 1920s in the Mewat region of northwest India, 
the Tabligh Association was only recently introduced into Burma, 
during the country’s pivotal post-independence era. U Nu, the Burmese 
Prime Minister at the time, was committed to a policy of transforming 
Buddhism into the state religion and lobbied two Muslim politicians—
ministers Rashid and U Khin Maung Lat—to dissolve the Bamar 
Muslim Congress parliamentary group (BMC), better known in 
Burma by its acronym Burma Ba-Ma-Ka (Yegar 1982: 122). After 
losing its parliamentary group status, the BMC would go on to lose 
all legal recognition in 1975. Meanwhile, Muslims were forbidden any 
right of association, and some associations, like the Bar Street Free 
Muslim Dispensary and Scholarship which had been major recipients 
of private donations, were killed off. Nowadays, charitable missions 
that help develop a “modern inter-operation of Muslim ideology” 
are accomplished indirectly through non-denominational NGOs or 
associations.
Two important Muslim faith-based organizations, which exist 
without parliamentary representation, were created during the same 
era that saw Ne Win taking power by coup in 1962. These are the 
Committee (Jimiatul) Ulama of Religious Studies (Awlama sasana 
pinyashin mya aphway), which deals exclusively with religious affairs, 
and the Religious Council on Islamic Affairs (Islam Sasana Kaunsi), 
which inversely takes strong political stands. Both are, to this day, the 
most influential Muslim institutions in Burma.
The Tabligh Association succeeded in establishing itself in 
Burma through successive stages, notably by infiltrating different 
Muslim religious groups, to whose fragmentation it contributed. While 
relations between the Ulama Committee and the Religious Council on 
Islamic Affairs were, from the start, confrontational and competitive, 
the antagonism between the two was due to the development of the 
Tabligh Association. Having first been turned down by the Ulama 
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Committee, whose members it had tried to recruit, the Tablighis turned 
their interest to the Religious Council. The Tablighis’ growing influence 
in Burma at the time cannot be understood without considering the 
political context of the era and, especially, the 1964 nationalization 
of private capital. The latter led to a massive exodus of entrepreneurs 
of Chinese and Indian origin. The ones who decided to stay included 
many Muslims, who then turned to the Tablighis as a source of reliable 
support. But it was from 1974 on, at the height of the civil war and 
when the country was inaccessible to foreigners, that the Tabligh 
missionaries (who were mostly from India) really succeeded in holding 
sway in Burma. This occurred first at an individual level and then 
through the Religious Council, which had agreed to host them within 
its ranks. With their rapid rise, the Tabligh Movement was integrated 
as well within the Ulama Committee in 1976, and its overall influence 
has continued to grow ever since.
Today, the five Muslim organizations that receive official govern-
mental recognition are, in order of importance: (1) the Ulama Committee; 
(2) the Religious Council; (3) the Muslim National Affair Organization 
(Ma-Aha-Pha), created after the events of 1988 by Sayar Chal, a former 
teacher and member of the National Council, who had been close to 
Ne Win; (4) the Committee of Myanmar Muslim Youth (Myanma 
Muslim Lu-ngay Aphway); and (5) the Malawi League (Malawi Aphway 
Akhyup), whose influence is marginal.
The primacy of the Ulama Committee is heavily due to the presence 
of Tablighi members within its ranks. As a local informant told me 
in May 2013, “If Ulama is the head [it is because] the Tablighis are 
the body.” Locally, the Tabligh is defined as an orthodox proselytizing 
organization—the term “missionary” is not used because its entire 
process is based on a principle of invitation (dawah)—with its 
members hailing from the Deobandi Hanafi School. Moreover, the 
Islamic orthodoxy that it advocates is sometimes described as 
fundamentalist. The Tablighis are therefore Islamizing the Muslims 
of the country by “de-Burmanizing” them. They follow fiqh or 
jurisprudence and impose a strict dress code including white garb, a 
turban and a beard for men, and veils and—though still very limited—
the chador for women.
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Regardless of their origin, the vast majority of Muslims in Burma 
are Sunni, with 90 per cent following the Hanafi school. A subdivision 
of this school of thought consists of two branches: (1) the Brailawii, 
known in the country under the name Gawrana, an influential minority 
that counts 100,000 followers in Mandalay, Shwebaw and Yendin in 
Central Burma, and accompanies its rituals with musical instrumentation 
(which is considered unacceptable by the other Muslim trends); and 
(2) the Deobandi, composed of Tablighis, along with another group 
that differentiates itself by ignoring certain Tabligh-imposed rules like 
meeting at night in the mosque.
A discussion of Islam in Burma would not be complete without 
mentioning the Mu’tazila Association, which was introduced into the 
country through the Muslim Aligarh University in Uttar Pradesh in 
northern India. Its members represent, worldwide, a very marginal 
share of Islam and consider themselves neither Sunni nor Shia. They 
base themselves on a theology of reasoning and consider the esoteric 
practices of Sufism as a “conspiracy of Islam” against rational thought. 
They receive revelation through extended thought and reflection, and 
believe that it is through reason and rationalism that the transition 
to modernity occurred. The core of the movement in Burma is in 
Yangon at the Su-Taung Pyait Mosque, known also as the “59th Street 
Mosque”.
The message of “Islamizing the Muslims of Burma”, propagated 
by the Tabligh, is insufficient, even in its radicalism, to explain the 
growing stigma against the Muslim population or the recurring issue, 
in recent years, of the Rohingya. This is despite the fact that nowadays, 
during discussions on Islam in Burma, being a Muslim is seen as 
synonymous with being Rohingya—the latter being a unique case that 
combines ethnic revendication, religious belonging and trans-border 
community issues. It should therefore be treated as such, especially 
when persecutions against the Rohingya have such a high potential 
for leading to further violence and radicalization across the country 
(Dovert and Madinier 2003). Moreover, there has been no direct 
relationship between the abuses committed against the Rohingya—
which are more akin to a trans-border dispute—and the stigmatization 
of being considered the other in Myanmar, of which the Muslims are, 
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after a succession of many others (Indians, ethnic groups, opposition 
party), the most recent victims.8
While there have been, in the past, policies prejudicial to 
Muslims, they were part of a wider pattern of discrimination to the 
same extent as policies against Chinese or Muslims interests. When 
the first instance of anti-Indian violence started in the 1930s, it was 
due to the fact that the Indian community, whether pawnbrokers, 
land developers or officials, was seen has having enriched itself 
significantly during the colonial era, to the detriment of locals. The 
Indian population became a de facto scapegoat9 for the Burmese 
nationalist movement Dobama Asiayone (We Burmans Association), 
during its fight for independence (Smith 1999 [1991]: 53–4). During 
the World War II, some 500,000 Burmese Indians therefore began a 
second exodus, fleeing both the Japanese army and the Burmese 
Independent Army. However, while this resentment against the Indian 
community is rooted in history and has affected the broad concept 
of Kala (including how Europeans and Chinese are seen), it is not 
specifically relevant to the current treatment of Muslims. The third 
Indian exodus occurred in the 1960s, after Ne Win’s coup and the 
nationalization of private enterprises and collectivization of land. It 
led to at least 300,000 Indians and 100,000 Chinese fleeing Burma 
en masse (Smith 1999 [1991]: 98). The degree of involvement of the 
Muslim community in this tidal wave of forced migration out of Burma 
was therefore more of an indirect consequence, as the primary objective 
had been the appropriation of foreign capital in the country (held in 
part by the Indians and Chinese).
8 It should be added that of the Muslim ethnic religious groups, only the Kaman in 
Arakan state are among the 135 officially recognized ethnic groups: they are referred 
under the code n° 702 in the 2014 census formular. All the other Muslim ethnic 
subgroups—Rohingya, Panthay, Pashu, Myaydhu, Pathi (totalling eight officially 
recognized ethnic Muslim subgroups known as Kyiliya, Surathi, Bengali, Magaw, 
Kaka, Pathein, Nasapuri and Hindustani)—are attached to the code n° 914 attributed 
to all non-officially recognized minorities.
9 The concept of a “scapegoat” was developed by the French philosopher René Girard 
(1982) but should not be used to describe the antagonism between the Burmese central 
government and the ethnic central powers, even though the “mimetic rivalry” that 
both have generated against rich Indians would seem to be operational.
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Without reducing the scope of these forced migrations, which 
affected the broad category of Kala, those abuses cannot be put at 
the same level as the atrocities that have been committed against a 
category of Kala reduced to only target Muslims. In particular, 2013 
was marked by anti-Muslim revolts of a different nature, as the 
conflicts reached a more extreme degree of brutality (Physicians for 
Human Rights 2013), and were repeated incessantly across the country 
through the year: for instance, April 2013 in Okan (1 dead, 9 injured 
and 70 homes burned); March 2013 in Meiktila (43 dead); May 2013 
in Lashio (a vandalized mosque); August 2013 near Sagaing (several 
dozen houses burned), and the village of Htangon in Sagaing Division 
(several shops and houses looted and burned). Everything suggests 
that the upcoming presidential elections will only amplify this return 
to terror.
Moreover, some threats were not reported in media. In December 
2012, residents of Muslim districts of Mandalay were warned by local 
authorities that armed men would come to attack the neighborhood. 
The residents fled, with the exception of a few courageous ones who 
stayed, armed with sticks and machetes to protect their homes. This 
exodus ended a week later with their return to the neighbourhood. 
However they, like many across the country, continue to live in fear 
of going out into the street due to the risk that the slightest incident 
involving any individual could transform the entire neighbourhood into 
a target. As during the worst days of the dictatorship, fear has settled 
back into the country.
Ecumenical movements have been set up here and there to try 
to stop the Islamophobic excitation, but have had little success or 
significance. It was in Yangon’s 59th Street Mosque that Buddhist 
monks were invited to meet with the Muslim community. The 
event was on the cover of the 27 May 2013 issue of The Voice, a 
weekly Burmese journal, which is not evident from the English title. 
The cover photo showed a monk dressed in saffron robes standing 
in front of the mosque (mihrab), facing the white-clad Muslim 
community. Despite the intensity of the image, the coverage of The 
Voice received a far-from-consensual reaction. The meeting was held 
two days after the violent events that led to the sack of the mosque in 
Lashio (Shan state), mentioned as a “place of worship” in the paper. 
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Some believed this meant the meeting took place too late, while 
others asserted that a prayer room was an inappropriate meeting 
place. Overall, the dubitative Muslim reaction was matched by the 
indifference of the Christian community.
Christians have also put in place, over the years, several 
ecumenical movements: the most effective one meets annually for a 
week throughout numerous churches of different denominations. Every 
day, two host churches belonging to two different congregations invite 
their coreligionists of other Christian denominations. For example, 
a Lisu Baptist church and Catholic church the first day, a Kachin 
Baptist church and an Anglican church the following day, and so on 
for seven days. The turnover process from one church to another is 
extended to the structure of each religious office, as for example: if 
a Lisu Baptist church is in charge to host the office, a member of a 
Kachin Baptist church will be in charge of the preaching, a member 
of an Anglican church will be in charge of the Biblical readings, a 
member of the Independent Christian Mission will be in charge of 
the hymns and a member of a Catholic church will be in charge 
of the prayers. Only a few congregations exclude themselves from 
the ecumenical movement, among which are the Fundamentalist 
Baptist movement and most of the evangelical churches such as the 
Assemblies of God. Aside from that, the general principle of the 
ecumenical offices is to ensure that the four constituent parts of the 
Christian ritual comprise the ethnic and religious diversity (Robinne 
2007: 262–4).
There have been other initiatives. Notably, the Mandalay Methodist 
College has opened its courses to students of all nationalities and 
denominations, though most come from the different components 
(Baptist, Methodist, Presbyterian, Lutheran, etc.) of the Myanmar 
Council of Churches (MCC) or, alternatively, of churches that have 
stayed apart such as the Evangelical Church. The school principal 
sees “ecumenism as meaning to the level of the Christians”, which 
is why he refuses monks’ requests to join the Christian theology 
courses. As for Muslims, no contact with them has been established. 
But when the discussion turns to anti-Muslim conflicts, the principal 
speaks of a relationship without ostracism because “charitable 
Christian associations do not discriminate in any way”. Yet responding 
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to violence in a concerted manner is not a priority for him, since 
“violence, while not normal, is also not so much religious, as born 
of the political context”. However, Christians know as well that they 
represent a potential target and have therefore tried to stay away from 
public exposure.
What is changing today is not so much the forces at play—
even though a civilian government has replaced a military one—nor 
the reification of different community identities (despite the risks 
of engendering further conflict), or the fact that while ceasefire has 
put a precarious stop to the conflicts, this has been due more to the 
combatants’ fatigue as the peace agreements remain largely lacking. 
What is changing today is not either the resilience of an ethnic state, 
based on an essentialist vision of the nation, with its underlying tensions 
between communities that prevents the emergence of an integrated and 
pacified nation-state. Instead, what has been changing in a country 
still trying to reconstruct itself, and where sectarian tensions are both 
forcing the dictatorship’s hand and undermining the ongoing changes, 
is the choice of the community targeted.
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